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Here we perform a statistical analysis of
the official data from recent Russian par-
liamentary and presidential elections (held
on December 4th, 2011 and March 4th,
2012, respectively). A number of anomalies
are identified that persistently skew the re-
sults in favour of the pro-government party,
United Russia (UR), and its leader Vladimir
Putin. The main irregularities are: (i) re-
markably high correlation between turnout
and voting results; (ii) a large number of
polling stations where the UR/Putin results
are given by a round number of percent;
(iii) constituencies showing improbably low
or (iv) anomalously high dispersion of results
across polling stations; (v) substantial dif-
ference between results at paper-based and
electronic polling stations. These anoma-
lies, albeit less prominent in the presiden-
tial elections, hardly conform to the assump-
tions of fair and free voting. The approaches
proposed here can be readily extended to
quantify fingerprints of electoral fraud in any
other problematic elections.
Legislative elections to the Russian Parliament,
the Duma, and presidential elections were held in
Russia on December 4th, 2011 and March 4th,
2012, respectively. Widespread belief that the out-
come of legislative elections was manipulated led
to large-scale public protests unseen in Russia since
the early 90s; still, virtually none of the alleged ma-
nipulations were officially acknowledged. Statistics
is known to be a powerful tool to pinpoint irreg-
ularities in election data that could be caused by
unfair or fraudulent voting [1, 2, 3], and this pair of
major elections provides a unique opportunity for
comparing election data side-by-side, as most of the
party leaders later ran for president. On one hand,
sociogeographic distribution of the voters could not
have substantially changed within three months be-
tween the elections, so both datasets should ex-
hibit similar patterns. On the other hand, public
protests after parliamentary elections resulted in
unprecedented anti-forgery activities at the presi-
dential elections, such as live web broadcast from
most of the polling stations and intense public con-
trol by volunteer observers. With this in mind, we,
inspired by methods of two-dimensional correlation
spectroscopy [4], analyse the data from both elec-
tions in Russia and identify a number of anomalies
that persistently skew the results in favour of the
pro-government party, United Russia (UR), and its
leader Vladimir Putin.
The election data are officially available online
at Russian Central Election Committee website
(izbirkom.ru) detailed to a single polling station.
Seven parties participated in the parliamentary
elections with four of them having passed the 7%
threshold; five candidates ran for president (see
Methods for details). There are ∼95000 polling sta-
tions in Russia, grouped in 2744 constituencies in
83 regions. The election statistics comprises more
than 109 million of registered voters with 65.7 and
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Figure 1: Summary of results by United Russia and Vladimir Putin. (A) Ballots obtained at polling stations
showing a certain turnout and result of United Russia (in 1% × 1% bins). Number of ballots is colour-coded;
the cluster in the upper right corner is heavily saturated to enable other data to be visible. The black curve
depicts an overall result for each turnout bin. White lines show linear fits to the black curve before and after
the 50% turnout; the R2 value and the regression coefficient are depicted next to each fit. (B) Total number of
ballots cast for each party depending on the result at the polling station (in 0.5% bins). Inset shows the Fourier
power spectrum of the United Russia trace. (C) Number of ballots depending on the turnout (0.5% bins). The
colour coding is the same as in (B). Dashed line shows the part of UR trace proportional to the sum of all other
parties; red shading shows the difference. The UR trace is truncated at 100% turnout for the sake of clarity; the
maximal value is 0.98 · 106. (D) Two-dimensional histograms for three other elected parties. Colour scale is the
same as in (A). (E–H) Similar plots for the presidential elections.
71.7 million votes cast in legislative and presiden-
tial elections, respectively. United Russia (UR)
won the parliamentary elections with a result of
49.31%, while Vladimir Putin defeated his rivals
with a landsliding figure of 63.60%.
Figures 1A and 1E show 2D histograms of the
number of ballots in favour of UR/Putin as a
function of turnout and respective vote share at
each polling station. Apart from the main clus-
ters at ∼52% turnout and ∼30% votes for UR and
∼60%/55% for Putin, there are two prominent fea-
tures at both plots that clearly distinguish them
from other participants’ histograms (Figs. 1D,H):
(i) an unusual cluster of votes in the vicinity of
95% turnout, and (ii) a long tail of votes beginning
at the central peak which shows a high correlation
of the results with the turnout (marked by black
curves, known in 2D spectroscopy as the centre line
slope [5]). The clusters at 90–100% turnout yield
∼3.5 million ballots for the winners in both elec-
tions and can be traced back to six republics of
North Caucasian Federal District, and Republics
of Mordovia, Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan. In
each of these nine regions, there are a number
of constituencies that exhibit voting results with
extremely low dispersion across polling stations,
significantly lower than dispersion value imposed
by binomial model (e.g., 25 constituencies with
p < 0.0001 for parliamentary and 9 constituencies
for presidential elections, see Table S1 and Meth-
ods). This suggests that the results in these con-
stituencies were artificially fixed to certain percent-
age values.
It is instructive to consider a projection of the 2D
histograms onto the vertical axis, which gives a dis-
tribution of the number of ballots cast for UR and
Putin depending on their results at every polling
station (Figs. 1B,F). The unique feature of these
histograms is sharp peaks located at “round” num-
bers of 65%, 70%, 75% etc. The periodic character
of these peaks is evident from the Fourier spectra
that show prominent harmonics at 1/5%−1 (insets).
By far the highest peak in both cases is located at
99.5% and originates solely from a single region of
Chechen Republic. Other peaks can also be traced
back to particular constituencies, but are usually
not confined to a single region. These peaks, which
are highly statistically significant (see Table 1 and
Methods), comprise ∼1.4 million ballots for UR
and ∼1.3 million ballots for Putin. The supernatu-
2
ral character of the peaks strongly suggests that the
votes for the winners were manipulated a posteriori
to fix the vote shares at appealing round values.
The second prominent feature of the 2D his-
togram in Figs. 1A,E is a remarkable correlation
between the turnout and the result of UR (correla-
tion coefficient of 0.68) and Putin (0.53). Note that
at lower turnouts both correlations are negative,
becoming positive only at turnouts higher than the
position of the main clusters. The histograms for
other competitors show exactly opposite behaviour:
low or even positive correlation at lower turnouts
and negative correlation further on (Figs. 1D,H).
In general, correlation between turnout and vot-
ing results is a well-known phenomenon, observed
in many countries [6]. However, dependencies as
strong as found here are hard to explain without
an assumption of administrative pressure and/or
vote manipulation [3, 1, 2].
The correlation between turnout and voting re-
sults at the national scale could have arisen due to
aggregation of widely dispersed but otherwise un-
correlated results from different territories, given
large cultural and socio-economic differences be-
tween regions of Russia as well as between urban
and rural areas. To address this issue, the data pre-
sented on Figs. 1A,E were decomposed into three
parts: urban areas, rural areas, and the nine afore-
mentioned republics (see Fig. S1 and Methods).
Both urban and rural areas separately exhibit high
correlations; further detalization to the region level
shows that high correlation is not characteristic for
every region but is confined to only some regions
of Russia. Furthermore, in regions demonstrating
high correlations, similar correlations are already
observed at the level of individual constituencies
(see Supplementary Information). This shows that
the observed correlations are not an aggregation ar-
tifact but an internal feature of specific constituen-
cies (see SI).
One of the most striking examples of such corre-
lations is given by the city of Moscow where par-
liamentary elections resulted in an extremely high
correlation between turnout and UR result (Fig.
2A). The situation was totally reversed in the pres-
idential elections, where Putin’s result was strongly
anticorrelated with the turnout (Fig. 2B). Also,
the horizontal projections of the 2D histograms
(which show the number of ballots as a function of
turnout) acquired similar shapes for all candidates
Figure 2: Voting results in the city of Moscow. Num-
ber of votes for UR (A) and Putin (B) at polling
stations showing a certain turnout and result in par-
liamentary and presidential elections, respectively (in
1% × 1% bins). R stands for correlation coefficient
(excluding 5% of ballots at highest and 5% at lowest
turnouts). Note that two distinct clusters of ballots at
∼50% and at ∼70% turnout and a high positive cor-
relation between turnout and UR result in (A) turned
into a single well-confined cluster and negative correla-
tion between turnout and Putin’s result in (B). (C, D)
Horizontal projections of (A) and (B), together with
the histograms of other participants. The colours are
the same as in Fig.1. The red-coloured number in (C)
shows the area of the red shading, similar to Fig. 1C.
(Fig. 2D), in contrast to the parliamentary elec-
tions where the UR curve had a pronounced tail
at high turnouts (Fig. 2C). Moreover, averaged
standard deviation (SD) of the UR/Putin results
across polling stations in each Moscow constituency
decreased sharply from 12±5% (parliamentary elec-
tions, mean±s.d.) to 4±2% (presidential elections).
This drastic change in the electoral data is most
naturally explained by the tight public control im-
plemented by angry citizens in Moscow after alleged
falsifications in the parliamentary elections.
Moscow results demonstrate that dispersion
across polling stations in each constituency can
serve as yet another metrics of election anomalies.
In urban constituencies one expects to find a rela-
tively uniform voting (i.e. with low dispersion) due
to population homogeneity. In both elections, there
is a dense cluster of urban constituencies (Fig. 3)
showing SDs of around 2–7%, which probably indi-
cates the normal range of SDs. At the same time,
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Figure 3: Standard deviations in 730 large urban con-
stituencies (at least 8 polling stations with more than
1000 registered voters), excluding the nine republics, for
parliamentary (A) and presidential (B) elections. Ver-
tical axis shows the standard deviation of the results
across polling stations in a given constituency, while
area of the circles is proportional to the total number of
registered voters in the constituency. R stands for cor-
relation coefficient. Note the sharp decrease of the SD
for Moscow constituencies (red circles) in presidential
elections. At the same time, in presidential elections 9
out of 10 constituencies with the highest SD are located
in the city of St. Petersburg.
in the parliamentary elections (Fig. 3A) there are
many constituencies showing much larger SDs, up
to 27% (see Table S2). Furthermore, there is a
strong correlation between the SD and the overall
UR result (correlation coefficient 0.62), indicating
that high SDs might be induced by manipulated
results at some (but not all) polling stations in a
constituency. In contrast, the similar data for the
presidential elections (Fig. 3B) are much more con-
fined, with the number of constituencies with SD
over 10% dropping from 185 to 28. Again, the most
parsimonious explanation is that in the presidential
elections votes in most (but still not all) Russian
cities were counted in a more fair way than in the
parliamentary elections.
To estimate the amount of ballots gained by the
winners due to unusually high correlation of their
votes with turnout, we begin with the parliamen-
tary elections and consider the projection of the 2D
diagram (Fig. 1A) onto the horizontal axis (Fig.
1C). It looks similar to its vertical counterpart (Fig.
1B), with sharp peaks at several round percent-
age values and an extra maximum at large turnout.
Note that, like in the Moscow case (Fig. 2C), cor-
responding histograms for other parties look quite
different from that for UR, but very similar to each
other. The part of UR histogram that is not pro-
portional to the cumulative histogram of other par-
ties (and is directly related to the positive correla-
tion of UR result with turnout) can easily be sep-
arated by summing up votes for all parties except
UR and rescaling the resulting curve to fit the UR
curve at lower turnouts, as shown schematically in
Fig. 1C. A more accurate calculation, performed
individually for urban and rural parts of every re-
gion (see Table S3 and Methods), yields∼11 million
votes for UR (out of total 32.4 million) associated
with the turnout-UR correlation. One may specu-
late that this part of ballots for UR was in some way
“unfair” (stuffed, fraudulently counted, or obtained
in non-voluntary voting settings). If the applied
procedure were entirely accurate, discarding these
votes would decrease the nationwide UR result to
∼39%. However, as some part of the observed cor-
relation between UR result and turnout could have
arisen naturally (due to, for instance, social confor-
mity [7] or other confounding factors), this number
probably represents an upper estimate. The simi-
lar procedure applied to the presidential elections
yields a more modest result of ∼7 million votes (out
of total 45.6 million) for Putin, which is consistent
with the increased public control and official anti-
forgery measures.
Finally, at both elections, some polling stations
(∼5.5% nationwide) were equipped with electronic
ballot boxes to scan the ballots and count votes
automatically, thereby reducing possibility of hu-
man interference. Our analysis revealed (Fig. 4)
that within the same constituencies UR result at
the electronic polling stations was on average 7.1%
lower than at the traditional paper-based ones (dif-
ference significant with p = 10−51, see Table S4
and Methods), and Putin’s result was 4.7% lower
(p = 10−35). While it cannot be taken for granted
that electronic polling stations constitute a repre-
sentative sub-ensemble, these differences are fairly
consistent with our estimates above.
Concluding, we have used the 2D correlation
analysis to efficiently pinpoint a number of anoma-
lies in recent Russian elections, with a short sum-
mary given by Table 1. Even though in all metrics
discussed the presidential elections appear to be
fairer than the parliamentary ones, various anoma-
lies still amount to millions of ballots. While statis-
tical analysis per se does not (and cannot) serve as
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Figure 4: Correlation between winners’ results at the
electronic and the paper-based polling stations at all
constituencies with electronic polling stations in par-
liamentary (A) and presidential (B) elections. Circle
areas are proportional to the number of registered vot-
ers in a constituency. Filled circles show constituen-
cies located in the nine republics. Red circles show
constituencies where UR/Putin results at electronic
and paper-based polling stations are significantly differ-
ent with p < 0.05 (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon ranksum
test); blue circles show all the remaining constituencies.
a concluding proof of any possible fraud, it clearly
highlights the alarming fingerprints in the voting
results.
Methods
General background
Seven parties participated in the parliamentary
elections: United Russia (49.3%), Communist
Party (19.2%), A Just Russia (13.2%), Liberal
Democratic Party (11.7%), Yabloko (3.4%), Pa-
triots of Russia (1.0%), and Right Cause (0.6%).
Five candidates participated in the presidential
elections: Vladimir Putin (leader of United Rus-
sia, 63.6%), Gennady Ziuganov (Communist Party,
17.1%), Mikhail Prokhorov (independent, 7.9%),
Vladimir Zhirinovsky (Liberal Democratic Party,
6.2%), and Sergey Mironov (A Just Russia, 3.9%).
Data acquisition
The raw election data are officially available
at Russian Central Election Committee website
(izbirkom.ru) as multiple separate HTML pages
and Excel reports; the data from 95228/95416
(here and below numbers refer to the parliamen-
tary/presidential elections) polling stations were
downloaded programmatically to form a database.
The accuracy of the resulting databases was ver-
ified by checking regional totals and comparing a
number of randomly chosen polling stations with
the respective information at the official website.
The list of urban constituencies was composed by
taking all 792 constituencies conforming to cer-
tain name patterns (for instance, having the word
“city” in the name) and manually adding 53 obvi-
ously urban constituencies (total number of con-
stituencies is 2744). Total number of ballots cast
in these urban constituencies was 37.1/41.1 mil-
lion, and 28.3/30.1 million in the remaining (“ru-
ral”) ones; additional 0.3/0.5 million ballots were
collected abroad. Both election databases along
with the explanatory text are available in the on-
line supplementary materials. The nationwide lists
of electronic polling stations are not officially avail-
able. Therefore, the lists of 4373/4943 polling
stations with electronic ballot boxes in 72/76 re-
gions of Russia were compiled of data gathered at
the websites of regional electoral committees (e.g.
st-petersburg.izbirkom.ru/etc/138_1pril.doc for St.
Petersburg) and the government purchasing por-
tal (e.g. zakupki.gov.ru/pgz/documentdownload?
documentId=54880223 for Irkutsk region).
Data analysis
To plot the curves presented in Figs. 1, 2, and
S1, we added an artificial white noise (uniformly
distributed from −0.5 to +0.5 votes) to the num-
ber of ballots obtained by each party/candidate on
each polling station [8] and summed up the ballots
within a bin of 0.5% for both turnout and result.
The procedure was repeated 10 times, and the aver-
age was displayed. This eliminates possible artefact
peaks associated with division of integers (for ex-
ample, turnout is the ratio of two integer numbers).
Correlations
In all cases, we use Spearman’s correlation coef-
ficients, as they are more robust to outliers than
the more conventional Pearson’s ones (e.g., mili-
tary or hospital polling stations often behave like
outliers, with turnout close to 100%; moreover,
polling stations located at the airports and train
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Parameter 2011 2012
Result-turnout
correlation for the
pro-governmental
candidate
Computed over all polling stations 0.68 0.53
Urban areas only 0.44 0.29
Share of constituencies with significantly
positive correlations (p < 0.05) 47%
35%
Peaks at round
numbers
Area, millions of ballots 1.4 1.3
Significance of the highest peak before 90% p ≈ 10−19 p = 5 · 10−5
Joint significance of the peaks at 65%... 85% p ≈ 10−70 p = 10−15
Anomalously low
dispersion of
results in a
constituency
Number of constituencies with dispersion lower
than the binomial one, p < 0.0001 25
9
Anomalously high
dispersion of
results in a
constituency
Number of urban constituencies with standard
deviation over 10% 185
28
Anomaly
estimation
Number of ballots ∼ 11 · 106 ∼ 7 · 106
Difference between percentage values of the
official and estimated results, percentage points ∼ 10% ∼ 4%
Koibatost
Averaged difference between the results at
paper-based and electronic polling stations 7.1%
4.7%
Significance of the difference p = 10−51 p = 10−35
Table 1: Anomalies in the voting data. The term koibatost is derived from a Russian name of the electronic
ballot scanning device, KOIB.
stations, where turnout is not defined, are officially
assigned the turnout of exactly 100%). None of
our conclusions depend on this choice: we repeated
all our analyses using Pearson’s correlation coeffi-
cients, and the difference was always negligible (be-
low 5%).
Analysis of peaks
The area under the peaks in Figs.1B,F was calcu-
lated as the area between the actual curve and its
smoothed version (filter cutoff frequency 0.2%−1,
intervals ±2% around each peak substituted by a
horizontal line segment before smoothing) in the
intervals ±0.5% around each peak. The curve
is quite noisy and so some peaks could have ap-
peared by chance; assuming this as a null hypothe-
sis, we can estimate the significance of peaks. First,
standard deviation σ was calculated as the root-
mean-squared difference between the curve and its
smoothed version in the interval from 30%/50%
to 90% skipping intervals ±2% around peaks lo-
cated at 65%, 70%, 75%, 80% and 85%, and the
height of each peak hi was expressed in the result-
ing σ values. The p-values were then calculated
as 1− erf(hi/√2), where erf denotes the error func-
tion. For parliamentary elections the height of the
65% peak is ∼ 9σ, which corresponds to p ≈ 10−19;
the product of p-values for the first 5 peaks we es-
timate to be at least 10−70. For presidential elec-
tions the highest peak is located at 75% and is 3.9σ
high (p = 5 · 10−5); the cumulative p-value for the
same five peak positions is equal to 10−15. As we
are multiplying five separate p-values, the values as
low as 0.055 ≈ 10−7 can still be considered not sig-
nificant; p-values obtained here are many orders of
magnitude lower than that.
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Anomalously low variance of results
per constituency
First of all, we disregarded all polling stations with
less than 50 registered voters (these are mostly tem-
porary polling stations, often located on ships, and
therefore not representative of other polling sta-
tions in the same constituency), and took all 2681
constituencies with more than 5 remaining polling
stations. For each of these constituencies, we esti-
mated the standard deviation of UR/Putin shares
across polling stations as median absolute devia-
tion multiplied by 1.48 (median absolute deviation
is the median of deviations from the median; for
a Gaussian random variable it is 1.48 smaller than
standard deviation) as a more robust alternative
to calculating standard deviation directly. If p is
the median share and n is the median number of
ballots across polling stations in the constituency,
then the standard deviation would be given by√
p(1− p)/n, assuming the purely binomial distri-
bution of voting at every polling station with prob-
ability of each person to vote for UR/Putin being
p. As expected, in 97% of constituencies under
consideration the observed standard deviation was
larger than the binomial one, which is the case if
actual value of p varies across polling stations (for
instance, due to local inhomogeneities). However,
in 83/87 constituencies the observed standard de-
viation was smaller than the binomial one.
To estimate the statistical significance for each
of these 83/87 constituencies, we assume binomial
voting as our null hypothesis, i.e. we assume that
on a polling station where the share of votes for
UR/Putin is p, every person votes for UR/Putin in-
dependently with probability p. Let us now define k
as the number of polling stations in a constituency.
We take the half of the polling stations k2 where
the UR/Putin share is closest to the median value
of p, and set p1 and p2 as the minimal and maximal
share in these k2 polling stations. The probability
p0 to obtain a result between p1 and p2 on a polling
station with n ballots, assuming a binomial distri-
bution of voting, can then be readily calculated as
F (bnp2c, n, p)−F (bnp1c, n, p), where F is binomial
cumulative distribution function (when bnp1c was
equal to bnp2c we took bnp1c− 1 instead). Finally,
we calculate the p-value as the probability to get
at least k2 successes out of k trials with probability
of success being p0, i.e. F (bk2 c, k, p0). There are
25/9 constituencies with p < 0.0001 and 10/4 with
p < 10−10. Most notably, in 8/2 of these 25/9 con-
stituencies the observed variance is not only lower
than the binomial one, but also the lowest possi-
ble: at each of these k2 polling stations the num-
ber of ballots in favour of UR/Putin is given by
multiplying the total number of ballots by a fixed
probability p0, and rounding the result to the near-
est integer number (the resulting variance is non-
zero only because of this rounding). While theo-
retically this could have happened by chance, in
reality it is extremely unlikely. All of these 25/9
constituencies are located in the aforementioned
nine republics (six republics of North Caucasian
Federal District, and Republics of Bashkortostan,
Tatarstan and Mordovia), which justifies consider-
ing them separately.
Standard deviations in urban con-
stituencies
The data presented in Fig. 3 are derived from
all urban constituencies, with the nine republics
excluded. To calculate the standard deviation in
each constituency, we disregarded all polling sta-
tions with less than 1000 registered voters. Smaller
polling stations, that are not typical for urban
areas, are often situated in hospitals or military
zones, and therefore might substantially increase
the standard deviation. The 49 constituencies with
less than eight remaining polling stations were also
omitted as it is not possible to reliably estimate
standard deviation with only few data points. This
left 730 constituencies to be analysed.
Estimating the amount of votes asso-
ciated with the turnout-outcome cor-
relation
Figure 1C shows the distribution f of votes in favour
of United Russia depending on the turnout, and
the distribution g for the sum of votes for all other
parties. Until a threshold turnout of ∼50%, these
two distributions are excellently proportional, f =
αg (with α being a scale coefficient), while at higher
turnouts United Russia’s distribution starts to rise.
The number of additional UR ballots is thus given
by
∑
(f − αg). The computation for the case of
presidential elections is exactly the same.
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We performed this analysis for every region, sep-
arately for urban and rural parts, each time setting
the turnout threshold in such a way that 20% of
all ballots come from the polling stations with this
or lower turnout. This particular threshold value
was chosen to reflect the turnout intervals where
the number of UR ballots is still proportional to
the sum of ballots for all other parties. Then α was
found with a least-squares fit, and the amount of
additional UR/Putin ballots was calculated by tak-
ing the sum starting from the threshold turnout.
Seven regions belonging to North Caucasian Fed-
eral District were analysed altogether, with thresh-
old turnout set manually to 75%. In this Federal
District UR/Putin results at higher turnouts in-
crease rapidly and cease being proportional to the
sum of votes for all other parties.
Analysis of results from electronic
polling stations
To calculate differences between UR/Putin results
at paper-based and electronic polling stations, we
took all 509/454 (out of 2744) constituencies that
had at least two electronic and at least two paper-
based stations. In 422/371 of these constituencies,
the joint UR/Putin result at all traditional polling
stations was higher than at all electronic ones (see
Fig. S3). The mode of the difference distribution
was 0.2%/0.7%, while the average difference was
7.1%/4.7%, which was significantly higher than the
mode with p = 10−51/10−35 (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test). The slight non-zero mode of the distribution
might be due to some bias in how the electronic sta-
tions were located (e.g., in the city centres, where
UR/Putin support might have been lower than in
the city outskirts).
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Supplementary Discussion
1. Correlation strength at different
aggregation levels
Even though there is strong positive correlation be-
tween turnout and UR/Putin result in the nation-
wide data, in some regions this correlation is absent
or even negative. In 11/20 regions (here and be-
low: parliamentary/presidential elections) the ur-
ban part demonstrates significant (p < 0.05) nega-
tive correlation between turnout and UR/Putin re-
sult, and in 27/ 23 regions urban correlation does
not significantly differ from zero (p > 0.05). For
rural parts these numbers are 2/1 and 4/6, respec-
tively. In general, correlation increases at higher
aggregation levels: if all individual polling sta-
tions are considered, the correlation coefficient is
0.68/0.53, as stated in the main text; taking all
constituencies as data points yields the result of
0.80/0.63; taking all regions — 0.82/0.69.
Intraregional correlations between turnout and
UR/Putin results do not arise due to aggregation
of different constituencies: these correlations can
already be observed inside individual constituen-
cies. To show that, for both urban and rural parts
of every region we computed the overall correlation
coefficient Ri and the constituency-level correlation
coefficient Qi, given by computing correlation coef-
ficients inside each constituency and averaging over
constituencies. Values of Ri and Qi were highly
correlated with correlation coefficient of 0.85/0.89
and regression slope of 0.74/0.77. Overall, positive
and significant (p < 0.05) correlation is present in-
side 46%/35% of all constituencies (in 23%/15%
for p < 0.001), as opposed to only 3%/4% showing
significant (p < 0.05) negative correlations.
2. Relation between high koibatost
and high standard deviation on the
constituency level
For urban constituencies in the parliamentary
elections there is a high correlation (0.66) be-
tween standard deviation of UR results and paper-
electronic difference (calculated over 264 con-
stituencies where the data are available, see Meth-
ods). Moreover, the same constituency (in the city
of Magnitogorsk) holds the top positions according
to both criteria (see Tables S2 and S4, which can
hardly be a coincidence. This additionally proves
that high standard deviation is indeed a useful met-
ric for election anomalies.
3. Urban-rural separation
One point of concern with the urban-rural sepa-
ration is that only the polling stations from fully
urban constituencies are classified as urban. As a
result, “rural” part still contains numerous small
towns. This might induce a spurious correlation
between turnout and UR/Putin results, as smaller
settlements tend to demonstrate higher turnout
and higher UR/Putin results. To address this issue,
we separated “rural” part of each region into two
parts: large rural polling stations with the number
of registered voters over 950 (mostly small towns
and large villages), and small rural polling stations
with the number of registered voters less than 950
(mostly small villages). The 950 threshold was cho-
sen because the distribution of polling stations by
the number of registered voters is bimodal with a
node around 950. Such an approach indeed reduces
“rural” turnout-UR correlations (for instance, for
the parliamentary elections from 0.64 to 0.58), but
the overall estimate of the number of votes associ-
ated with correlations, when computed separately
for urban, large rural and small rural polling sta-
tions in each region, remains almost the same (for
the parliamentary elections the number slightly de-
creased from 11 million to 10.5 million).
Supplementary Figures and Ta-
bles
See next page.
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2011 2012
Region and constituency p Region and constituency p
1 Respublika Dagestan, Dahadaevskaja < 10−15
Respublika Severnaja Osetija,
Levoberezhnoj chasti g.Vladikavkaza
2 · 10−14
2
Kabardino-Balkarskaja Respublika,
Prohladnenskaja
1 · 10−15 Respublika Dagestan, Derbentskaja
gorodskaja
1 · 10−13
3
Respublika Dagestan,
Sulejman-Stal’skaja
5 · 10−15 Respublika Dagestan, Kiziljurtovskaja 1 · 10−12
4
Respublika Dagestan, Mahachkala,
Sovetskaja
4 · 10−14 Kabardino-Balkarskaja Respublika,
Prohladnenskaja
7 · 10−11
5
Respublika Dagestan,
Babajurtovskaja
4 · 10−13 Respublika Dagestan, Hunzahskaja 2 · 10−10
6
Respublika Bashkortostan,
Sterlitamakskaja gorodskaja
6 · 10−13 Respublika Dagestan, Kizljarskaja 2 · 10−9
7
Respublika Severnaja Osetija,
Levoberezhnoj chasti g.Vladikavkaza
2 · 10−12 Respublika Tatarstan, Zainskaja 6 · 10−6
8 Respublika Dagestan, Sergokalinskaja 2 · 10−12 Kabardino-Balkarskaja Respublika,
Baksanskaja
3 · 10−5
9 Respublika Dagestan, Hunzahskaja 6 · 10−12 Respublika Tatarstan, Nurlatskaja 6 · 10−5
10 Respublika Dagestan, Kizljarskaja 8 · 10−12 Respublika Dagestan, Bezhtinskaja 3 · 10−4
Table S1: Top ten constituencies with the most anomalously low dispersions
2011 2012
Region and constituency p Region and constituency p
1
Cheljabinskaja oblast’, Magnitogorsk,
Pravoberezhnaja
27.3% St. Petersburg, #17 16.3%
2
Cheljabinskaja oblast’, Magnitogorsk,
Ordzhonikidzevskaja
26.8%
Krasnodarskij kraj, Novorossijsk,
Vostochnaja
16.0%
3
Vladimirskaja oblast’, Vladimir,
Oktjabr’skaja
25.5% St. Petersburg, #30 15.4%
4 Moscow, rajon Gol’janovo 23.5% St. Petersburg, #19 15.2%
5
Cheljabinskaja oblast’, Magnitogorsk,
Leninskaja
23.3% St. Petersburg, #27 13.9%
6 Moscow, rajon Severnoe Butovo 22.4% St. Petersburg, #2 13.7%
7
Vladimirskaja oblast’, Kovrovskaja
gorodskaja
22.0% St. Petersburg, #1 13.5%
8 Moscow, rajon Hamovniki 21.8% St. Petersburg, #11 12.9%
9 Moscow, rajon Bogorodskoe 21.7% St. Petersburg, #24 12.8%
10 Moscow, rajon Prospekt Vernadskogo 21.3% St. Petersburg, #29 12.8%
Table S2: Top ten urban constituencies with largest standard deviations (SDs)
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2011 2012
Region
Correlation-
related
votes
Region
Correlation-
related
votes
1 Six republics of North Caucasus 2 300 000 Six republics of North Caucasus 1 800 000
2 Moscow 1 000 000 Respublika Tatarstan 650 000
3 Respublika Bashkortostan 790 000 Respublika Bashkortostan 570 000
4 Respublika Tatarstan 770 000 Kemerovskaja oblast’ 440 000
5 Krasnodarskij kraj 580 000 Krasnodarskij kraj 410 000
6 Saratovskaja oblast’ 450 000 Nizhegorodskaja oblast’ 280 000
7 Kemerovskaja oblast’ 410 000 St. Petersburg 260 000
8 Respublika Mordovija 360 000 Saratovskaja oblast’ 240 000
9 Rostovskaja oblast’ 320 000 Respublika Mordovija 210 000
10 Voronezhskaja oblast’ 260 000 Primorskij kraj 160 000
Table S3: Top ten regions with largest amounts of correlation-related votes
2011 2012
Region and constituency Koibatost Region and constituency Koibatost
1
Cheljabinskaja oblast, Magnitogorsk,
Pravoberezhnaja
36.8% Respublika Bashkortostan, Kiginskaja 31.1%
2
Astrahanskaja oblast, Astrahan,
Leninskaja
34.8% Astrahanskaja oblast’, Privolzhskaja 26.9%
3
Cheljabinskaja oblast’, Magnitogorsk,
Ordzhonikidzevskaja
34.1%
Respublika Bashkortostan,
Belokatajskaja
26.1%
4
Astrahanskaja oblast’, Astrahan’,
Kirovskaja
33.3% Tjumenskaja oblast’, Kazanskaja 24.5%
5 Tjumenskaja oblast’, Jurginskaja 31.6% Voronezhskaja oblast’, Cemilukskaja 24.5%
6 Saratovskaja oblast’, Petrovskaja 31.4% Tjumenskaja oblast’, Abatskaja 23.6%
7 Saratovskaja oblast’, Rtiwevskaja 31.3%
Respublika Bashkortostan,
Kugarchinskaja
23.5%
8
Tjumenskaja oblast’, Tjumen’,
Vostochnaja
31.3% Tjumenskaja oblast’, Omutinskaja 21.7%
9 Respublika Mordovija, Ruzaevskaja 31.0% Tjumenskaja oblast’, Jurginskaja 21.2%
10 Tjumenskaja oblast’, Sorokinskaja 30.5% Saratovskaja oblast’, Marksovskaja 20.2%
Table S4: Top ten constituencies with largest values of koibatost. Koibatost refers to the difference between the
results at paper-based and electronic polling stations.
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Figure S1: Decomposition of two-dimensional histogram of UR (A–C) and Putin (D–F) votes shown in Figs.
1A,E into three parts: urban territories (A,D), rural territories (B,E), and the nine republics (C,F) that form
a separate cluster at very high turnout values (see text). Black lines show overall result for each turnout bin;
white numbers stand for correlation coefficients. Horizontal projections in the lower panel are analogous to Fig.
1C and show total number votes depending on the turnout (0.5% bin). Black numbers represent total number
of ballots in these areas, red numbers show the amount of votes associated with turnout-result correlation. Red
shading is only an illustrative sketch as the actual calculations were performed for each region separately (see
text). The colour code corresponds to thousands of votes in a 1 × 1% bin. Note the shining dot in (D) at 60%
turnout and 80% result that can be traced to the city of St. Petersburg and comprises ∼36.5 thousand votes for
Putin (2.6% of the city total votes).
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